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The paper examines the situation  of child labor in Thailand in the last decade. It finds that child
labor has decreased significantly, for example, the labor force participation rates of those aged'13-14
years has almost halved since 1990. Despite this decline, 1.6 million children below the age of 16 are out
of school of whom 1.2  million are between 12 and 14 years. Most of them are from poor families. Many
face harsh conditions of employment that adversely affect their physical and mental development and can
lock them into poverty in the future thus perpetuating a vicious circle.
Empirical analysis suggests that at younger ages (below 14) direct education costs deter school
attendance. As the child gets older, income effects become more important determinants of child labor
than the costs of education. The paper then examines what incentives  the household can be provided with
to keep children in school,  the role of public education, and what can be done in the labor market through
additional measures  for those children who, notwithstanding the previous two interventions, will continue
to be at work.
Education subsidies are found to be justified from a social policy point of view: indeed there is a
failure in the market for education/child  labor. Our cost benefit simulations suggest that private
considerations make children withdraw  from school and join the labor market earlier than is socially
desirable. However, subsidies alone will not reduce child labor/increase  education by much: the
econometric results suggest that the education/child  labor response of such incentives is small, albeit
statistically significant. Therefore, public support to basic education (though not necessarily in the form
of public provision) should continue  along with policies that enhance growth and reduce poverty.
These measures are very much preventive and unable to improve  the working conditions of those
who will keep working or unlikely to make many children withdraw from the labor force.  Those
children that will remain at work will benefit from a combination of a more rigorous enforcement of
regulations against exploitative forms of child labor, targeted schemes (for example, for boys in the
construction sector and girls in prostitution), awareness campaigns and greater participation of local
organizations, communities,  unions and employers in the design and implementation of these programs.
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I.  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Thailand has experienced fast growth, in fact the fastest among the NIC's in the last decade
(1985-95), averaging 9 percent. Poverty declined to 13 percent of the population in 1992 from 21 percent
in 1988,  when growth starting accelerating. These trends have been associated with a sharp reduction in
child labor: in the age group 13 to 14 years for which comparable infornation exists since 1990, the labor
force participation  rate declined from 37 percent to 21 in 1993. Also, school enrollments have been
increasing due to a combination of rising household incomes, as a result of economic growth, and
increasing school availability, especially at secondary education level, as a result of the Government's
recent policy to achieve universal  junior secondary  education by 2000.  Finally, the 30-year-old family
planning policy is paying off: total fertility declined from approximately 6 children in the mid-i 960s to
2.1 children in 1993. However, the number of working children is still significant. Approximately half-
a-million children aged 13 to 14  years are included in the conventional statistics of the labor force, and
many of the 1.6 million below the age of 16 who are out-of-school are likely to be engaged in some forrn
of less visible employment.
Though poverty reduction and education expansion have been fast, it is not always certain that
these trends will continue in an uninterrupted way in the future.  Even if they do, child labor does not stop
permanently once a family just gets out of poverty. Though growth is lifting many households
permanently out of poverty, some will fall below the poverty line when an adversity occurs. Sizable
changes "in and out of" poverty can still take place in Thailand as many households are near the poverty
line. According to the most recent estimate, one-quarter of households have incomes that are only up to
15 percent above the poverty line, and the income gap for those below the poverty line increased from 35
percent in 1988  to 38 percent in 1992  (Krongkaew, 1995). Given that parents themselves are often
I  The  author  would  like  to thank  without  implicating  Jane  Armitage,  Amit  Dar, Bill  McCleary,  Costas  Meghir,  Lisa  Meyer,
Omporn  Regel.  Sudhir  Shetty,  and  Mike  Walton,  for  useful  comments  and clarifications  on and  other  inputs  to earlier  versions  of this
paper.  The  discussion  and  evidence  has  been  enriched  by  data,  comments  and  support  provided  by the  govemnent  of Thailand,  the
regional  office  of ILO  in Bangkok,  and  the  Thailand  Development  Research  Institute.  The  findings,  interpretations  and conclusions
expressed  in  this  paper  are entirely  those  of the  author  and should  not  be attributed  in any  manner  to the aforementioned  individuals
and  organizations,  to the  World  Bank,  to its affiliated  organizations,  or to the members  of its  Board  of Executive  directors  or the
countries  they  represent.engaged in unstable employment, families face harvest failures, and households have no savings to draw
upon or assets to borrow against, child labor can be summoned at any time to reduce the effects arising
from household income variability.
The justification for some form of support to poor households will, therefore, continue for some
time, especially in hard core cases of poverty or regional underdevelopment where the effects of growth
may take some time before they "trickle down." An additional reason is that the positive effects of growth
upon child labor (operating via rising incomes) can be moderated from the negative effects of the
reduction in family size in Thailand: the decline in the number of children has reduced the ability of
households to diversify their members' economic activities and insure themselves.  Therefore, though
growth should reduce the need for child labor, household demand for child work can remain high for
significant time after the household moves out of poverty until a threshold level of income security is
achieved. In short,  to the extent that child labor represents short-term choices made under temporary
constraints, the households' decisions for child work and schooling may divert from those that would
benefit the society at large.  Policies can, therefore, help reduce and prevent the under-investment in
children's human capital that arises from the poor's low incomes and inability to borrow against future
earnings. Such policies can accentuate the reduction of child labor and increase educational enrollments
to a level that current entrants to the labor force are sufficiently equipped with lifetime employability and
trainability: the prospects for ill-equipped workers and the economy's labor productivity will be bleak if
the educational composition of the current flow of workers into the labor force, of whom 50 percent are
educated at lower than junior secondary education, does not improve.
These observations  motivate the current paper that examines the usefulness of micro-
interventions, public  education and labor regulations in reducing child labor and increasing education
attainment in Thailand. More specifically:
First, the paper traces recent trends in children's activities in terns  of work, conditions of
employment,  and schooling. The available evidence suggests that many children are pulled out of the
education system not because of an immediate need for work but because poor households cannot finance
the direct costs of education. Thus the paper explores whether a subsidy, for example, in the form of a
grant to poor households  conditional on a child's school attendance, can be socially justified.  It finds that
indeed the social  benefits of subsidies by far outweigh their costs.  The subsidies can be targeted
individually  to needy children irrespective of location or more broadly to depressed areas where
enrollment  and school survival rates are low by regional standards.
Second, the paper argues that, alongside micro-interventions,  the expansion of basic education
through public funds should continue and become more balanced between rural and urban areas,
2especially Bangkok: it is the poor and those in rural areas who are primarily responsible for the low
school enrollments and rely almost exclusively on public education. The role of public education remains
because the empirical findings suggest that increasing the incentives to households  to keep their children
in school (for example, through grants) can affect only a few of the 1.6 million children (below 15 years)
who are out-of-school: the household response to such an incentive is empirically found to be small, a not
surprising finding given that low or no enrollment is particularly prevalent among the hard-core poor.
However, public education does not have to incur necessarily through public provision but can be used
for financing education irrespective of provider.  Public finance can play a complementary role to
provision: if students are given subsidies that can be used for attendance in any school,  then privately
provided education can help keep budgetary costs low and provide some relief on the pressure for public
funds to support an expansion of other education types and sectors. This policy can increase the
competition in the supply of education by public schools and private schools with additional beneficial
effects on costs and diversification  of education.
Third, correcting  the market failure (underinvestment)  in education through subsidies or other
means will not be sufficient  to address problems associated with the remaining large number of child
workers. The conditions under which children work are often extremely harsh in terms of long hours,
danger or unaccepted  forms of employment. In addition to the enforcement of regulations that would
ensure compliance with minimum labor standards for child workers, a range of targeted schemes can be
introduced in collaboration  with local organizations,  communities, employers' and worker's
representatives,  and international donors and technical assistance agencies. These schemes can include
projects targeted at boys in heavy work (such as in the construction,  sector), girls at risk of prostitution,
non-formal  education programs for those who have already left school and awareness campaigns
(through teachers, radio programs, video documentaries). Finally, "child-sensitive" regional and national
statistics on employment should be developed that would help monitor the situation and introduce
interventions in an effective and timely manner.
II.  BROAD TRENDS
Child labor has been on the decline since  the revival of growth in the late 1980s. Though it is
difficult to define and statistically record work performed by the very young, the number of working
children aged 13 and 14 years declined from 920,000 in 1990 to 530,000 in 1993,  and their labor force
3participation  rate from  37 percent  to just  over 20 percent  (Table  1).2 Preliminary  results  from  the Labor
Force  Survey  1995 (round  1) suggest that the labor force participation  rate have now declined  to 16
percent.
Table 1
Labor Force Participation Rates of Children aged 13-14,
Transition Rates from Primary to Junior Secondary Education,
Enrollment  Rates in Junior Secondary, and
Public Expenditure on Education (% of GDP)
1988-1993
Year  LFPR  Transition  Enrollment  Public Exp
1988  na  46.5  32.6  3.0
1989  na  50.4  34.2  2.7
1990  37.0  57.1  37.3  3.0
1991  35.1  65.4  41.9  3.1
1992  28.9  73.4  na  3.3
1993  21.1  85.7  53.4  3.6
Sources: LFPR and enrollment  rates  from Labor Force Surveys  (Round 3); Transition  rates from Vichai (1994); Public expenditure
from Educational  Statistics  in Brief 1995.
The decline in child labor has been accompanied  by an  increase  in the transition  rate from
primary  (Grade 6) to junior  secondary education  (Grade 7) as well  as an increase  in the  overall
enrollment  rate in junior  secondary  education.  The increase  in educational  enrollment  has come more
from girls than  boys (Table 2), and from  children  in households  headed  by own account  workers,
primarily  farmers who  account for almost half of the population  (Table 3).
Table 2
Female/Male  School Enrollment  (%) by Age
Age  1985  ___i:  ______  ______  1992  X;:
12  98%  100%
13  95%  97%
14  90%  95%
15  89%  91%
Source: Own calculations  from LFS tapes
2  In 1989  the cutoff point for including  workers in the labor force was increased  from 11 to 13  years. The Reports of the
Labor Force Surveys  prior to that date provided  combined information  on the labor force participation  of children in the age group
11 to 14 years.
4Table 3
Households with workers aged 11 - 15
Work  StatLis  of HH  No. of HH  HH  with  children  HH with  workers  % of HH's with
Head  working children
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (4/3)
1988
Private  employees  2403483  735974  164986  22.4
Public/parastatal  1027319  338642  23442  6.9
Employers  312897  115110  28432  24.7
Own  account  5934394  2400628  846250  35.3
Family workers  55701  25317  6411  25.3
Others  1472450  395231  83767  21.2
Total  11206245  4010904  1153287  28.8
1992
Private  employees  3393736  955694  215696  22.5
Public/parastatal  1209880  338950  22469  6.6
Employers  558595  181580  44659  24.6
Own account  6001410  2101333  580569  27.6
Family  workers  74749  24337  5974  24.5
Others  1892920  458810  73716  16.1
Total  13131289  4060703  943083  23.2
Source:  Own  calculations  from  LFS  tapes,  round  I
The increase in the enrollment  rate of junior secondary can only partly be attributed to
developmental factors, such as, rising household incomes due to growth that reduce the pressure for child
work and increase demand for education. Another factor has been the decision of the Government in
1990 to raise the education achievement of population and achieve universal junior secondary enrollment
by year  2000 (compared  to 37 percent  in 1990).  To this effect,  the budgetary  allocations  to education
have increased significantly. The ratio of public expenditures on education to GDP increased by 35
percent between 1989 and 1993,  from 2.7 percent to 3.6 percent. Given that the economy also grew fast
during this period, at an annual rate of 9 percent, the public resources allocated to education increased
substantially: capital expenditures increased in real terms by 3 times, and current expenditures doubled
between 1987  and 1993.3
An additional factor that contributed to the increase in school enrollments was the successful
family planning policies in the last three decades and the decline in fertility. As a result, total enrollment
in primary education declined by 700,000 since 1989  to 6.3 million in 1995. This has enabled the use of
some classrooms in primary schools for junior secondary education. In addition, under the initiative to
3  Education  Statistics  in  Brief,  1995.
5achieve universal junior secondary  enrollment, there has been an increase in the number of secondary
schools from 1,759 in 1991 to 2,140 in 1994. Junior secondary school enrollment increased from 1.3
million in 1989 to 2.2 million in 1995 (Table 4).
Table 4
Total (public and private)  enrollment in primary  and junior secondary education
and out-of-school  children by grade/age
Grade  1989  1991  1993  1995  Age
Total primary  6987240  6906336  6576886  6289408
Out of school  (1-6)  701914  407392  6-11
% not in school  10%  6%
Total junior  sec  1282118  1569929  1990808  2236070
Out of school (7-9)  173192  1209130  12-14
% not in school  47%  35%
All grades  8269358  8476265  8567694  8525478  6-14
Out of school (1-9)  2440106  1616522  _  _
X_____  ______  ______  __________  _22%  16%
Source:  Appendix  Table  A-1
HI.  CONDITIONS OF CHILD LABOR
Despite these significant changes, still 1.6  million children below the age of 15 are out of school
of whom 1.2 million are between 12 and 14 years.  Many of them work, even though they may escape the
official statistics. Often they face harsh conditions  that jeopardize their the physical and mental
development in addition to the fact that they will miss the future benefits of schooling. Tables 5  to 7
highlight children's working conditions from a series of child surveys though part of the reported
differences between them can be due to comparability problems.
Table  5
Weekly Working Hours of Children (11-15)
by Occupation
"H  age  Gr.  lsC
Aea  H>Ar  Freqenc  Avrag e H  our  Frequenc  A
Professional  49.5  8  44.0  26
Administrator  56.0  1  na  0
Clerk  57.2  11  48.7  15
Commerce  47.1  594  51.1  961
Farmer  48.8  4376  47.6  3932
Mining  44.5  2  na  0
Transport  57.7  99  50.5  11
Other  52.5  1215  50.2  1166
Services  53.9  117  65.6  1023
Total  49.6  6426  51.1  7134
Source: Averages  from 1985-1992  (Own  calculations  from  LFS  tapes;  see data  appendix)
6Table 6
Conditions of Child Work (%)
,  1986  1995
Daily  hours 8<  84.9  91.5
Weekly days  7  8.0  30.3
Night work  (10-6 am)  8.6  11.6  (1991)
Break  (<1  hour)  70.1
Monthly income (Baht)  400
Note:  In 1986  the average  daily  child  wage  in Bangkok  was  22 Baht  compared  to a minimum  wage  of 70 Baht.
Sources: Calculated  from Banpasiric  (1995)  based  on National  Youth  Bureau,  Foundation  for Children's  Development  and
Department  of Health
Table 7
Working Conditions  of Children
Working conditions  % of children affected
Light work/no risk  68
Work with machines/tools  with low risk  29
Heavy tasks/lifting  with high risk  3
All  100
Exposure to loud noise, chemical vapors, dust  67
Intelligence below average  79
Night Work-  9
% of Working Children in Bangkok coming from North East  65
Note:  Night  work  for children  is illegal
Source:  See sources  to Table  6
Children work long hours  and the trend is to work even longer.  Table  5  presents  the distribution
of children's  average hours  of work by occupation.  There  is little  variation  in the hours  worked between
occupations  and sexes though girls seem to work 10 hours more than boys in the services sector and 15
hours more compared to girls in other occupations. Also, 30 percent of children have a daily break that
lasts less than one hour (Table 6). Another 32 percent were engaged in activities that involved some risk
in 1986 and in 3 percent of cases a severe one (Table 7). More than two-thirds of children work in
conditions exposed to dust, loud noise, chemicals and vapor. Though there are no comparable figures for
adults, it can be assumed that children's participation in such activities is greater than average given their
low skills and perhaps parental selection to remove the less able children from school, if the fact that 79
percent of working children exhibit intelligence below average is taken at face value (and is not the result
of early and harsh work).  In fact, children working long hours (and presumably in harder tasks) have
also been found to have below nornal height and weight.
The percentage of children working more than eight hours a day has increased from 85 percent in
1985  to 92 percent in 1995 (Table 6).  The share of children working 7 days a week has also increased
7from 8 percent to 30 percent. In some cases child workers are not rewarded according to the long hours
they work and, though they can at times get assistance, the reality remains harsh for them.  According to
the records of the Foundation for Children's Development, nearly 900 children from 273 enterprises were
assisted during  the period 1982-1993. No payment was a problem in 12 percent of cases.  The most
prevalent problem was hard work/substandard conditions (37 percent), followed by violation of basic
rights (such as capture and hann; 17 percent). Accidents accounted for 5 percent of recorded cases.
"Trickled in job arrangements" affected 8 percent of children. Another 10 percent children had lost
contact with their families. In fact, 65 percent of working children in Bangkok originate from the poorest
region, the North East.
Though the labor force participation rates of children are declining, and in 1993 in every 100
workers there were 1.6 working children (compared to 3 percent in 1990), those who do work seem to be
subjected to hard conditions of employment. This may explain in part some of the deterioration in
children's working conditions. Children from families that face milder conditions of poverty probably no
longer enter the labor force, and they may have previously had more options and entered more acceptable
forms of employment. If this assumption is correct, the children that are now at work must be
disproportionately  (compared to children, say, one decade ago) arnong  the less fortunate ones, and this
may be one partial reason for the decline in employment conditions of children over time.
Table 8
Inspected Establishments and Children Working in Them, 1993
'Inspected  Children  Ratio
Establishments  Inspected  "Illegar'  *
(J1)  (2)  (3)  (3)/(2)
Northeast  5354  3078  2900  94
North  3374  1731  1516  88
Bangkok  16069  5221  3516  67
Central  5899  5109  2539  50
South  3355  4675  1264  27
Around  Bangkok  1685  9738  2005  21
Total  35738  29552  13740  46
Note:  "Illegal" refer to cases where the employment  of a child breached some aspect of legislation
8Most (60 percent) children employees are in manufacturing and more than 35 percent in hotels,
restaurants, trade and services (Appendix  Table A-2). Even among them, who are working in the most
visible part of the labor market, half are employed under conditions of some form of mistreatment, as
shown in Table 8. Though the table does not suggest any clear pattern between regional prosperity and
employment conditions,  the two poorest regions, the North East and the North, seem to have the greatest
probability of child mistreatment. Bangkok and the Central regions follow but the area around Bangkok
is last in the regional ranking after the South region. It is likely that these regional figures are affected by
different structures of production and technologies and perhaps the intensity of labor inspections but there
is no more information on this.
IV.  WHY ARE CHILDREN OUT OF SCHOOL?
Children's allocation of time depends heavily on household characteristics combined with
economic factors. An econometric  analysis of the Labor Force Surveys between 1985 and 1992 suggests
that work and schooling decisions are significantly related to the education of the head of household.
There is a strong inter-generational  transfer of human capital from parents to children in the sense that
households  with more educated parents are more likely to keep their children in school and less likely to
have child workers (Table 9).
Table 9
Predicted probabilities  (%) by head's of household education
LF participation  School  enrollment
Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls
No/less  than  lower  primary  24.2  24.4  65.3  60.2
Lower  primary  21.5  22.1  67.9  65.7
Elementary  9.7  11  9  85.3  81.1
Lower  secondary  4.4  8.0  89.8  85.3
Upper  secondary  3.9  15.5  90.8  75.9
University/Teacher  training  1.3  13.5  95.7  83.9
Source;  Calculated  from  Appendix  Table  A-3a  and  A3-b.
The prime reason for not attending school at a young age (12 to 14 years) appears  to be the direct
cost of education rather than the need for additional income from child work (Table 10). In this age
group, financial  considerations are the main cause for not attending school (63 percent) and 20 percent of
children are out of school because of work. Distance to school (a "supply" constraint) is not an important
reason for non-attendance. This suggests  that demand constraints on the household's ability to finance
education are significant. At an older age (15 to 19 years), the need for work accounts for one-quarter of
out-of-school children. Other factors become also more important at that age such as "no interest" in
9studying (this can relate to household preferences) and "could not be admitted" (an indication of ability).
Still among those aged 15 to 19 years, 40 percent cite lack of financial support as the reason for non-
attendance. Thus, financing  the costs of education can be a prime constraint to the increase in education
enrollment.
Table 10
Reasons for Not-in-school by Age Group
(% of all not-in-school children)
Reason  12-14  15-19
Medical  1.2  1.5
No financial  support  63.3  40.4
Distance  3.4  1.8
Had  to earn  livelihood  19.7  26.5
No interest  9.5  15.2
Could  not be admitted  0.7  7.5
Misconduct  0.2  1.3
Others  1.9  5.7
Unknown  0.0  0.0
Total  100.0  100.0
Source:  Report  on Children  and Youth  Survey  (NSO,  1992)
The costs of education, rather than immediate need for child work, is also indicated by an
examination of the time allocation of children since they left school (Table 11). At younger ages (9 to 11
years) most out-of-school children are engaged in housework, an activity that could be more easily
accommodated  with education and does not immediately suggest great need for the more rewarding
unpaid or paid work. Paid or unpaid work, conventionally defined, occupies more children at
successively  higher ages:  95 percent of boys and 90 percent of girls between ages 15 and 19.
Table 11
Time allocation since leaving school by age
(as % of children out-of-school with known activity)
:  d  Boyst  i:  - Girls
9-11  12-114  15-19  9-11  ~  12-14  15-19
Work  (paid)  0.0  35.8  47.6  0.0  40.5  45.5
Unpaid  work  5.4  53.6  47.0  22.2  37.0  43.5
Housework  94.6  9.7  3.7  77.8  21.2  10.2
Training/study  0.0  0.3  1.3  0.0  0.7  0.6
Looking  for  work  0.0  0.3  1.3  0.0  0.7  0.6
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  Calculations  based  on children  with  a known  activity  fonr the Report  on Children  and Youth  Survey  1992
10These figures, and the econometric analysis (Appendix Tables A-3a and A-3b), suggest that child
labor and school non-attendance are primarily a phenomenon among poor households that arises more
from the inability  to finance education  and to a lesser degree by a pressing need for paid or unpaid work.
This raises, therefore the possibility, of some fonn of public policy that would reduce the direct costs of
education in addition to keeping supply constraints low (such as increasing the number of classrooms at
junior secondary education level and keeping distances to schools within reach of households).
Direct subsidies for school attendance can help children to stay on in schools. 4 Such subsidies
can be designed to be paid to poor households. They should decrease the incidence of child labor and
also increase the prospects of children from poor families throughout their lifetime: providing these
children with additional education  will make them more employable and will also increase the rewards to
their labor in the form of higher productivity in self-employment  or higher wages in paid employment. In
fact, the less educated are already faring worse in the fast transforming Thai economy than the more
educated: the share of those with less than secondary  education declined from 87 percent in 1985 to 81
percent in 1992 (Table 12). However, their share in unemployment increased from 71 percent to 84
percent as did their unemployment  rate from 3.2 percent to 4.6 percent. These workers now have the
highest unemployment rate and are the only group that experienced an increase in unemployment despite
the rapid economic growth since the late 1980s. Policies that would accelerate the increase in junior
secondary  education  will, therefore, benefit the poor.
Table  12
Unemployment  and  employment  shares
and  unemployment  rates  by  education  level  (percent)
_  Rates  Unemployment
Education  level  Unemployment  Employment  Rates
1985  1992  1985  1992  1985  1992
Less/pre-prinary  71  84  87  81  3.2  4.6
Sec  general  14  10  7  10  7.3  4.5
Sec vocational  5  3  2  3  9.2  4.1
Higher  education  7  3  2  4  11.0  4.1
Teacher training  3  1  2  2  5.2  2.7
Total  100  100  100  100  3.8  4.5
Source:  Vichai  (1994)
4  Another,  albeit  rather  theoretical,  altemative  is  to  impose  taxes  on  children's  income  and  use  the  money  to  subsidize  school
attendance.  Such  a  policy  may  have  stronger  effects  and  be  cheaper  but  this  is  even  harder  to  implement  and  monitor;  it can  end  up  as
another  way  to  raise  taxes  and  the  black  market  possibilities  for  child  labor  are  endless.  Moreover,  the  policy  may  encourage  some
inactivity  while  the  objective  of  policy  should  be  to  encourage  school  attendance.
11V.  PROVIDING A SUBSEDY  FOR SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
The desirability of subsidies for inducing more children to attend school than those determined
by household decisions in a market environment  requires an examination of the welfare effects of such a
policy. Though such analysis cannot be done on the information provided by the Labor Force Surveys
(there are no data on household income), it can be assumed that child work and schooling decisions are
made by the parents, with the child's wage being the relevant price.  From this assumption, econometric
analysis can examine how a price effect operating via a subsidy conditional on school attendance can
affect school enrollment rates. 5
The calculations  for estimating the fiscal implications of the subsidy and the economic effects of
an expansion of junior secondary  education are based, first, on the assumption that a child is given a
subsidy equal to 10 percent of his/her wage and, second, on the econometrically estimated elasticity of
school enrollments to wages of 10 percent. As most working children in the Labor Force Survey reported
to be engaged in unpaid work, there is little reliable information on what a child's labor is worth to them
and their families. However, since the majority of working children are in rural areas and engaged in
farming (Tables 3 and 5), child labor can be assumed to be worth 30 percent of the average agriculture
wages that were about Baht 2,000/month in 1993.
Even this average wage in agriculture may be too high as a benchmark for the present
calculations:  the average monthly wages of all employees aged 15 to 30 years with completed primary
education are approximately  Baht 2200 (in 1992). For those with only some primary education the
monthly earnings were Baht 1900 and for the illiterates only Baht 1500. Also, the implied wage of
unpaid family workers (household  labor income from own-account  work and self-employment divided by
all non-wage workers) is only Baht 1300. Finally, a special survey on child work showed that the
average child wage in Bangkok  was only Baht 400 in 1986.6 If children's wages have kept up with
inflation, they should have increased  by 37 percent in 1993 to approximately Baht 550. Thus the
assumption that a child's work is worth on average around Baht 660 seems reasonable. 7
5  In  some  sense  the  compensation  should  be  less  than  the  labor  earnings  of  children  if  parents  derive  some  utility  from  their
children  going  to  school.  However,  as  the  data  do  not  have  information  on  household  income,  this  welfare  measure  cannot  be
computed  keeping  a constant  standard  of  living.
6  Minimum  wages  were  Baht  70/day  in  Bangkok  in 1985  or,  for  a 26-day  month,  Baht  1860  monthly.  Thus,  the  average
wages  of  working  children  in  Bangkok  were  only  one-fifth  of  the  minimum  wage  (Source:  Chantana  Banpasiric,  1995).
7  An  ILO/Friends  of  the  Children  survey  of  child  workers  in  the  garment  industries  in  Chaing  Mai  in  1994  found  that
children  working  4  to 6  hours  a  day  overtime  earn  Baht  1,000/month  without  any  additional  welfare.
12Budgetary implications
In 1993 there were two million students in  junior secondary  education. According to the econometric
results (calculated from Appendix Table A-3b), a 10 percent decline in wages would increase school
enrollment by 1  percent. Conceptually, this decline can come about by paying a grant for attendance  to
the children out-of-school equal to 10 percent of their wages. Assume that indeed such a grant is paid.
This should increase school enrollment by 20,000 and would require an increase to the public budget on
education between Baht 108 million and Baht 180  million (depending on the level of children's wages).
The increase in junior secondary  enrollment by 20,000 would require an increase in the public
expenditure on education by 0.9 percent to 1.6  percent for the subsidy alone. It will also require an
additional 1 percent increase in the budget simply because the student population will increase by 1
percent. The two figures combined suggest a required budgetary increase of 1.9 percent to 2.6 percent. In
short, the cost of educating each of the additional 20,000 children will be equal to two to two-and-one-
half times the public cost of a child who is already attending school. This raises the issue whether this
relatively high cost is justified from a social cost/benefit point of view.
Efficiency considerations
The efficiency effect of public funds that would support completion  of the junior education cycle
depends on the direct costs of education  (public and private expenditures on junior secondary  education),
the indirect costs of education (loss of children's output), and the benefits from this additional education
(lifetime productivity gains of the beneficiary child from his/her work within and outside the labor
market).
The are no precise estimates for the annual unit costs ofjunior secondary  education alone. The
total budget for secondary  education is Baht 23 billion (1993) and, given that senior/junior unit costs are
2: 1, the annual unit cost for junior secondary  comes to approximately  Baht 5,700.8 Annual private direct
costs of supporting a child in public  junior secondary education are Baht 1,300 (NSO, 1992: p. 29).
Finally, foregone wages of the child can be used to approximate the loss of output: they can come to Baht
6,600 to Baht 11,000 depending on whether they are assumed to be from 30 percent or 50 percent of
wages in agriculture. These costs add up from Baht 41,000 to Baht 54,000 for the complete junior
secondary cycle (three years).
8  This  figure  is based  on  total  junior  enrolment  of  two  million  compared  to  an  overall  secondary  enrolment  of  one  million.  It
is most  likely  an  overestimate  as  half  of  enrolment  at  senior  secondary  level  is  in  more  expensive  vocational  education.
13On the benefit side, the wage increase that children who complete junior secondary would enjoy
compared to those who drop out at the end of primary education provides the minimum social gain. From
earnings functions the standardized wage differential between graduates from junior secondary  and from
primary education is 20 percent. In monetary terms, this percentage translates into lifetime gains between
Baht 141,000  and Baht 56,000 for work till the age of 55 years depending on the rate of discount (from 1
percent to 6 percent). Throughout this range of values for a social discount rate lifetime benefits would
exceed costs though only by a small amount (Baht 1,600) if both child wages and the discount rate are
assumed to be unrealistically high (last row in Table 14).
However, the impact on wages is only part of the social gains from additional education. The
effect of education upon productivity is only partially measured by wages as some of its increase can
accrue to employers in the form of additional profits. Also education, especially at basic level, has often
sizable externalities in the form of increased lifetime employability and trainability in the market place
and better health and nutrition outcomes within the household, especially from women's education.
Finally, additional benefits include more effective family planning and reduction in fertility as well as
stronger transmission linkages between parents' and children's human capital (Table 9).
Rather than assuming  that the productivity impact of education will be only that suggested by the
junior secondary to primary wage differential (20 percent), which constitutes very much a private return
(to the child and his/her family), we assume that the social rate of return is 10 percent. In this case, the
present value of the societal gain over a 40 year productive lifetime (till the age of 55 years) exceeds
costs by a factor from two to four depending on which levels of discount rate and child wage are used.
The next issue is to decide what the social rate of time preference is. The societal rate can be
quite low as societies "live for ever" and face low uncertainty compared to individuals  who have limited
lifetimes, face significant unexpected risks that cannot be easily pooled and often come across severe
liquidity constraints. 9 Given that even after relatively heavy discounting (6 percent), the ratio of benefits
to costs is more than two, the results suggest that unless child wages are high, administration costs
significant and targeting considerably imperfect, a subsidy can be justified on the grounds of social
benefit/cost considerations.
The case for subsidies is strengthened when the benefits/costs of additional education are
recalculated from a purely private perspective. The results suggest that there is likely to be some market
failure among poorer households who have typically higher rates of time preference than the society at
large. The lifetime private benefits for the poor cannot reasonably be discounted by a low rate, such as 3
9  The historical real return to the relatively  risk-free  US Treasury bills is I percent.
14percent  or 6 percent  as assumed  earlier.  Their rate of time preference  can easily  be  15 percent  or even
higher during  adverse seasonal  conditions  and can approach  to 100 percent  during  an emergency
situation.
Table 13
Costs and Benefits of a 10 Percent Age-related Subsidy for Attending Junior Secondary
Education
Social
1. Elasticity of school enrollment to an age-related wage  10%
2.  Enrollment  in junior secondary education in 1993  2 million
3.  So, 10% subsidy  will increase  enrollment by  20000
4.  Ratio of total cost of subsidy  to public expenditures on junior




5.  Social  costs and lifetime discounted social benefits for a child who receives the grant and completes  junior
secondary:
Social  benefits  based  on:
Costs  Discount  Rate  10%  Productivity  20% Wage  Increase
________________  ________________________  G  ains
30%  of agr  40883  1%  254158  140772
w  ages  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
40%  47483  3%  169117  93670
50%  54083  6%  100557  55696
Source:  see  text
The values of private benefits  under different  discount  rates and private  costs (that  is, excluding
the public  subsidy to education)  are shown in Table  13.  Benefits  are calculated  in the  same basis as
before, that is, they are the present value of wage gains due to additional education discounted over a 40
year period. The private costs are total costs as in Table 14 but exclude the public expenditure (subsidy)
component (Baht 17,000). Thus, private costs can be between Baht 23,700 to Baht 36,900 compared to
benefits of only between Baht 18,700 and 8,300 (depending on which discount rate is used).
Table 14
Private costs and benefits from completing  junior secondary education
Costs  Benefits
30% of agr wages  23,700  15% discount rate  18,700
40%  30,300  20%  12,000
50%  36,900  25%  8,300
Source: see text
15There is, therefore, a substantial difference between social and private benefits and costs that
arises primarily from the benefit side. Private benefits are only a fraction of social benefits (one-fifth or
less). In fact, the discrepancy  between social and private benefits is likely to be understated. The
benefits have been adjusted assuming  that households discount future benefits practically over the
lifetime of a child (40 years). It is likely that the time horizon of households, especially the poorer ones,
is much shorter than this, and the discounted gain in wages is smaller. Also, parents may place a low
weight to their children's earnings after the latter form their own families and leave the parental home,
especially under conditions of migration that are significant in Thailand.
In conclusion, the divergence between the social and private indicators used in the above analysis
suggest that a significant market failure may exist with respect to the education of young children from
the poorest parts of the population.
VI.  POLICY ISSUES
The synergy of successful family planning policy in the past, recent economic growth and
continuing  commitment by the Government  to expand education has resulted in significant rates of
change across a wide range of economic and social indicators (per capita income, family size, educational
enrollment, child work, poverty and so on). Particularly impressive is the fast expansion of school
enrollments and the significant reduction in child labor neither of which would have been easy  to achieve
without broad-based macro and social policies. In particular, the decline in child work has come from a
combination  of fewer children per family size and a reduction in child labor primarily in households of
lower socio-economic  status (Table 3).  Overall, the share of households with children aged 11 to 15
years declined by 14 percent between 1988 and 1992 (from 33 percent to 28 percent). This reduction
came largely from households headed by own account workers, primarily farmers, who constitute nearly
half of all workers.
Still, despite these apparently sizeable "trickle down" effects, there are remaining areas of
concern for which broad based policies may take significant time to reach. There are 400,000 primary
school aged children out of school; for secondary school aged children, 1.2  million. Many of them are
working often under harsh conditions. Even if the "trickle down" effects of broad-based policies are
completed in only one generation, this can still leave a significant part of 30 cohorts ill-prepared  for the
future who will drug the overall productivity of the economy for decades ahead.
While broad-based policies are increasingly  affecting the less poor and should continue, some
may have to be redesigned to support some regions more than others.  For example, households in rural
areas rely almost exclusively on public schools for the education of their children compared to urban
16areas. In Bangkok as many as 48 percent of enrollment at all education levels are in private schools
compared to 1 percent and 6 percent respectively of enrollment in primary and junior secondary
education in other regions (Table 15). Thus, in areas other than Bangkok the choice is between "public
education or no education," and this should be more so in rural areas in the poorer regions, such as the
North East.  Thus the expansion ofjunior secondary  education (providing schools, teachers, materials)
can focus on areas outside Bangkok and the main urban areas that are relatively better catered for by the
(expanding) private education sector.
Table  15
Public Share in Total Enrollments
Enrollment Rates by Level of Education
and Share of Bangkok  in Total Enrollment
by Education  Level in 1993
Level  Public Share in Enrollments  Enrollment  Rates
|  Bangkok  Others  Whole Country  Share of Bangkok
Prilary  53  99  90  8
Lower  sec  80  94  53  13
Upper  sec  50  80  28  22
Higher  78  87  22  55
Total  62  93
Source:  Calculated  from  Education  Statistics  in Brief  1993
Public support of education, especially at primary and junior secondary levels, can help reduce
supply constraints that the poorer face in educating their children. Building schools and providing better
transport infrastructure that will decrease the distance from home to school can reduce the time and
opportunity cost of education. The decline in capital expenditures on education in the 1980s coincided
with a stagnation or decline in school enrollment rates:  between 1985  and 1988 the net enrollment rates
of boys  11  to 16 years old declined from 75 percent to 72 percent. Then they increased  to 79 percent.
For girls the corresponding rates were 70 percent, 68 percent and 74 percent. The fiscal crunch of the late
1980s and the reduction in public expenditures also coincided with a decline in the transition rates from
primary to  junior secondary. However, the subsequent increase in real capital expenditures was
associated with a significant increase in the transition  rate (Figure 1).
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In addition to continuing broad-based policies, more targeted measures could be introduced to
reach those who would be increasingly coming from hard core poverty conditions. These smaller groups
can be marginalized households in Bangkok and other urban areas or be concentrated in rural pockets
where even significant effort in farming activities yields low returns, and child work and education can be
traded-off only under uneven conditions.
Three specific policies considered below are, first, direct subsidies for school attendance; second,
enforcement of child labor legislation with respect to conditions and type of employment; and, third, a
range of ad hoc interventions in certain areas of child work. The argument is as follows: education
subsidies will not only increase the human capital of those who would have been left outside the
education system from an early age but can also reduce the amount of child work. Then, labor legislation
can cater for the employment conditions of those children who would still be working. Finally, specific
projects at community level can focus and go deeper in areas of persisting problems.
Education Subsidy
Providing  direct financial support  in the fonn of a grant as highlightedearlier  (Table 13) can in no
way be considered  as the solution  to the problem of non-enrollment  at large: the private response  to a
subsidy  equal to 1O  percent of the child's wage will increase  in enrollment  only by 20,000 (compared  to 1.2
18million out-of-junior-secondary  education). However, it can be designed  to reached the poorest households,
in which case the welfare gains indicated by the earlier analysis can be sufficient  to justify the policy.
Children  in households  headed by the less educated,  and typically  poorer parents, are significantly
more likely  to be out of school and in the labor  force between  the ages of 11 and 16 years. Table 9 showed
that approximately  one quarter of children living in households  headed by those who have less than primary
education  are in the labor force and only two-thirds in school. In households  with heads that have completed
primary education,  there is a significant improvement  with little difference  between  boys and girls:  only 10
percent of children  work and more than 80 percent are in school.10  The response  of households  to education
incentives  is greater in households  headed by the less educated:  the increase  in school enrollment  in
households  with less educated heads from the 10 percent subsidy  used in the present calculations  could be is
twice that in households  headed by university graduates (Table 16).
Table  16
Percentage  Increase  in School  Enrollment
due  to a 10  percent  Age-related  Grant
by  Education  of Head  of Household
,  ___________________  Boys'  G irls
No education  1.2%  1.2%
Some/Completed  Primary  1.1%  1.1%
Secondary  0.5%  0.8%
Tertiary  0.3%  0.8%
Source:  Calculated  from  Appendix  Table  A-3.
The design  of this subsidy  also is important. These grants should be means tested in areas  where
school enrollment  is relatively high or be more liberally  provided  by being targeted to schools in areas where
attendance is low and child work prevalent. The former, a means  tested scheme,  is likely to create
disincentives  elsewhere in the system  and may be difficult  to implement in terms of administrative  capacity.
Given the regional nature of the Thai economy,  targeting areas, rather than households,  may be relatively
easy and less  distortionary  at the micro level -- for example, it is unlikely that parents  would migrate from a
wealthier  to a poorer  area because of an education  grant targeted to some children in a particular school.
The grant should not be paid when the child misses school. Some children,  particularly  in
agricultural  areas, might skip school days to engage in some form of farm  work. Such activity should be
discouraged  by a corresponding  reduction  of the subsidy. The grant should,  therefore, be paid on a daily or
weekly basis and not be a monthly or annual subsidy  de-linked  from actual attendance.  Obviously,  there are
1  0  There  is some  reversal  in  the  pattern  for  girls  as  the  education  of  the  head  of  household  increases  but  we  have  no
explanation  for  this.
19some problems with unexpected or unavoidable  incidents,  such as sickness  or family emergencies.
However,  these can be generally  monitored  by most schools in the locality in which they operate. The main
issue here is to avoid consistent patterns of work and non-attendance  that systematically  destruct children
from attending school on a regular basis and have permanent effects upon  their educational  achievement.
The grant should be age related as older children  have higher opportunity  cost (wages) than younger ones.
To improve  effectiveness of the incentive, current  participation  in the program  can be linked to earlier
minimum amount of school  attendance or minimum levels  of achievement. In this way, current attendance
would offer a return to the parents in the form of a future return. Another issue is how much to subsidize.
Our simulations  were based on a 10 percent subsidy  but this can be raised if, after a more detailed  analysis
than the present one, this proved  to be justified.
Finally, it can make  a difference  if it is the father or the mother or a fund for the child into which the
grant will be paid. Usually,  women tend to spend  more on children and men more on adult members of
households  but it is not clear whether the reverse relation holds, that is, whether a decision  to keep a child in
school  will be more favorably affected by "paying" the mother or the father. This  will relate to which parent
the benefits from child work accrue. More analysis on intra-household  division  of labor and migration
patterns  would be required  to establish  whether a child's work relieves  the work  undertaken by the mother
or father and for whichever  parent the incentives  are stronger.
Child  labor legislation
Direct attempts to reduce child labor, for example througi banning it altogether,  are usually
ineffective. A ban on child labor would imply that child labor "legally does not exist" and child workers will
become unprotected  (Rodgers and Standing, 1981).  In any case,  first, there are many forms of child work
that are both acceptable and useful to their families and the children  themselves. And, second, legislation  is
more effective when child labor is subjected  to hazardous  conditions  in a factory. However, these three
elements  can be masked. For example, child employment  during  the academic  year can be disguised  and
become more detectable  only during school  holidays. In Khon Kaen, some factories disguise child labor
under  the pretext of training programs or use putting-out  arrangements  for parts of production. Then the
parents  become sub-contractors  and employers  of children. This practice  may or may not eliminate  the
exploitation  of children though surely makes it less  visible. The objective  of a policy cannot be confined  to
the visibility of a problem: it should try to solve the problem  which in this case is harsh conditions  of
employment  and the under investment  in children's human capital.
Enforcement  of regulations,  existing or new ones, that improve  conditions  of work can be desirable
on both efficiency and equity  grounds. The enforcement  of regulation  dealing with type and conditions  of
20employment  can reduce, if not prevent,  the engagement  of children in activities  that are detrimental  to
child's physical  and mental development. Child  prostitution  is one such area. Another is excessive hours or
work  requiring undue physical  effort. Also, exposure  to environmental  hazards  (dust, chemicals,  noise) and
hazardous  work for minors  can be monitored  and reduced  to safe levels. Finally,  there can be no tolerance
for forced and slave labor.  I  1
The Govemment is increasingly  involved  in these areas. In 1992  it declared the intention  to bring
an end to abusive child labor. The Seventh Social  and Economic  Plan (1992-96)  pays attention  to the
importance  of human resources  development  for the country's development  reiterating the recognition of
child labor  that first appeared  in the Third Plan (1972-1976). The current Plan identifies child labor and
children in prostitution as two of the most critical issues, and the current objective is to increase  the
minimum working  age from 13 to 15  and to extend compulsory  education to nine years by the year 2000.
Two additional programs  aiming to reduce child labor  migration from the rural areas and to provide
protection  to children in the workplace  were approved by the Cabinet in November 1994  with the support  of
Baht 300 million (US$ 12  million) for a five year period.
The success  in combating undesirable  aspects  of child labor and reducing  it to levels that would not
prevent the acquisition of education  below  its socially  desirable level will depend  not only  on the actual
implementation  of these policies  but also on the rate of effective  enforcement  of labor regulation  and also
the appropriateness  of legislation  itself. For example, a notification  issued  by theMoLSW in 1993
prohibiting  employment  of children below  the age of 16 in deep sea fishing operations is yet to be
implemented. Though  there exists safety legislation,  it does not differentiate  between child and adult
workers. There are no specific  break-time  provisions  during working  hours for children though they are
naturally  disadvantaged  for working long  uninterrupted  hours. 12 Another case is minimum wages whose
recent increases and more rigorous  enforcement  may account for some of the decline in child employment
11  ILO Forced Labour Convention 1930  (No. 29), the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 1957  (No. 105),  and
Minimum  Age Convention 1973  (No. 138) provide a framework  for child labor. Other conventions (especially  those relating to
freedom  of association,  protection of the right to organize  and collective  bargaining)  are also relevant. See Bequele (1995).
12  Though employment  of children  aged 13  to 15  years requires  official permission,  this is waived in the case of work
involving  carrying  weights less than 10  kilograms  and for light work in most commercial and service activities. Child work is not
permitted (till the age of 18 years)  in metal melting  and molding operations,  and work with excessive  heat, cold,  noise, light,
vibration,  chemicals,  inflammable  substances except  in gas stations and similar, toxic materials  and so on. Child work is prohibited
in slaughter  houses,  casino and adult entertainment.  prostitution  houses,  massage parlors, places serving alcohol and the similar
establishment  (Banpasirichot,  1995).
21over time.  13 Finally,  child workers are excluded  from legislation  when they are engaged in self-
employment,  sub-contracted  work, farming and fishing or if they are aliens.
In effect, legislation  covers  only children  with employee  status who are a minority of child workers.
This indicates  the limits of legislation  in addressing  child labor. Legislation should therefore be
accompanied  by additional  interventions  discussed  below.
Targeted  interventions,  partnership and information  systems
In addition to education  subsidies and regulation  for children's working conditions,  targeted
interventions  at community  level can have rewarding  effects. Two programs currently undertaken  by ILO in
the context of the International  Program on the Elimination  of Child Labor (IPEC) provide insights  to such
interventions.1 4
A mobile training and sensitization  program for children  working/living in the construction sector
aims to introduce  children  in Bangkok  to skills development  and provide vocational  training opportunities as
an alternative  to working in the construction  sector. Children are provided with scholarships so that they can
quit work in  the sector. So far the project  has assisted 250 children at a cost of US$ 22,000. Cooperation
with employers  and related government  agencies  are currently being sought. The effectiveness and
expansion  of the project is under consideration  with action research undertaken  byThammasat University to
develop  an appropriate  educational  model for children of construction  workers.
Another  project  targets young  girls in North Thailand from being lured into forced labor. In
collaboration  with  NGO's the project  provides alternative  to young girls that face the risk of becoming
prostitutes. Over the last five years the project  provided access to basic education  for 150  girls as well as
leadership  training for young  women who can serve as examples  to girls. A vocational training program
caters for the needs of the very young  (below  the age of 15) - a reminder of the missed opportunities from
low enrollments  in junior secondary  education. After participation  in the program, girls are offered  job-
placement  assistance. Additional  links are sought with the Ministry of Education  and a feasibility study is
underway  to develop an appropriate  curriculum  for the girls at risk. Along similar  lines, another project  in
the Ministry  of Education  operating  in Chiang  Rai, Payao and Lampang  removes girls at risk from
13  Children  can  be substitutes  to adults  in the labor  market  especially  when  the latter  is  dominated  by unskilled  labor  and
technology  is  relatively  simple.  When  minimum  wages  are  enforced,  adult  workers  would  be preferred  by employers  assuming  that
they  are  more  productive  than  children.
14  ILO  (1995).
22vulnerable  social circumstances  and places  them at boarding schools that provide skills in agriculture  and
home economics.
These two programs,  though not formally evaluated so far, are indicative of the type of interventions
that can take place at community level and the role of donors, local organizations and the Government. In
addition,  partnership  with employers is important. Lack of active involvement  by employers  can limit the
effectiveness  of programs related  to child work. The Employers Confederation  of Thailand (ECOT) is
increasingly  participating  in IPEC and consultation  meetings have already been undertaken. The
involvement  of local governments  and trade unions would also prove beneficial for improving  working
conditions  including  a reduction in the long hours children  often work. 5
The welfare  of child workers can also be affected by supplementary  activities. These can include
opportunities  for non-formal  education  and availability  of health care services including  greater  cooperation
with medical  institutions  in reporting suspected  cases of child workers' abuse and torture. Public
information  campaigns  can help strengthen  the responsibility  of employers  and communities  on child labor.
Additional  awareness  campaigns aimed at teachers who can then coach their pupils and parents  can be
another avenue. Radio programs can enhance the capability  of mass media to bring to the attention  of the
public child labor  issues, as can also do video documentaries. The availability  of hot-line centers and
temporary (shelter)  services  can provide assistance  while women's groups can also be instrumental  in
helping problems  specific  to the employment  of girls.l 6
Finally,  the development  of regional and national statistics on child labor that would include
additional  indicators  to those included in the Labor Force Surveys can help monitor the situation  and
introduce  timely interventions. The collection of the statistics can bedelinked from the Ministry  of Labor
and Social  Welfare (MoLSW)  which has the formal responsibility  of labor inspections  so that attempts by
respondents  to underreport  non-compliance  with specific regulations  do not distort information. Then, this
information  can be provided  to MoLSW  and other Ministries so that interventions  can be effectively
designed  and coordinated.
1  5  There are such proposals for the case of child workers in the leather industry in Samutprakarn. However,  the supporting
role of trade unions  cannot  be assumed  to be automatic:  the objectives  of decent wages, employment  protection and regulation of
working  conditions  makes  unions natural enemies of child labor. Increased  awareness  on this issue among union members  is often
required. To this end,  ILO in association  with the Institute of Labor Studies and Management  at Chulalongom  University  are
developing  a training  package to sensitize  trade union leaders who are affiliated with the Labor Congress of Thailand  and the Thai
Trade  Union Congress
16  Such  activities  are included  or planned under IPEC as well as mobile drama performed by child workers  and shown in
schools.
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24DATA APPENDIX
The econometric  estimation  (see Costas Meghir (1996) "Children's Labor Force Participation  and
School  Attendance in Thailand," University College, London,  preliminary  draft) is based on Labor Force
Survey  tapes for round 1  (January to March) in 1985, 1988, 1991  and 1992. To them round 3 (July to
September)  results for years 1988  and 1992  were added. The data were pooled to create two sanples
consisting  of 24169 boys and 24250 girls with all the required  variables present. Wage  data were adjusted
by regional  consumer price deflators  using 1985  as base.
The data were pooled because there are not many useful observations  in each rounds to create a
sufficient  large sample that would be appropriate  for a country  like Thailand,  which is characterized  by
significant  regional variation. Still, the pooled sample has only around 7,000 working  children while the
wage equations are based in no more than 1,500  observations  as most child workers in the sample do not
report earnings. Therefore, it would  have been unwise to run regressions  on individual  survey rounds.
Labor force  participation  and school enrollment  equations  are estimated  usingprobit  models. In
each case the dependent variable is one whenever  the child is exclusively  engaged in  the relevant activity
(work or school). Consequently  the participation  and schooling  probabilities  do not add up to one: their
compliment  is the inactivity  rate. The effect of wages  on schooling  and labor  market choices was derived by
estimating  wage equations  for those children that reported positive earnings  and then imputing  wages  to all
children.
The following  variables were included in the labor force participation,  school enrollment  and wage
equations:
LW  Log real wage rate
Lwhat  Predicted  log real wage rate
Noper  Number of persons in the household
Oldsib  Number of older siblings
Nsib  Total number of siblings
edh#  Head's education  group
edsp#  Spouse's education  group  (# 1  to 13; see below)
rnd#reg#  LFS round (1 or 3) interacted with region (I to 5)
rg#yr#  Region interacted  with year
Agehead  Head's of household age in years
agehead2  j Head's of household age squared divided  by 100
25The specific codes (#) for each variable are as follows:
Year





I  No Education  (omitted)
2  Less than Pratom  4
3  Lower Elementary
4  Elementary
5  Lower Secondary
6  Upper Secondary
8  Upper and Higher  Vocational
9  University  Academic
10  University  Vocational
11  Teacher Training
12  Short Course  Vocational
13  Others
Region
I  North (omitted)




The first category out of a set of dummy variables was dropped.  So results are reported with
reference  to 1985  round 1 for illiterates  aged 11 in the North Region.
26Appendix Table A-1
Total (public and private) enrollment  (,000)
in primary  and junior secondary education
and  out-of school children by grade/age
1989  1991  1993  1995  Age
Grade
1  1257803  1235403  1137856  1075652  6
2  1186375  1127870  1089420  1017957  7
3  1164667  1146040  1064720  1045489  8
4  1147430  1143548  1083817  1032395  9
5  1126469  1144997  1114540  1056378  10
6  1104486  1108378  1086533  1061537  11
Total Primary  6987240  6906336  6576886  6289408
Out of school  701914  407392  6-11
% not in school  10%  6%
7  476096  608736  759675  843603  12
8  419790  519139  661989  744816  13
9  386232  442054  569144  647651  14
Total junior sec  1282118  1569929  1990808  2236070
Out of school  1738192  1209130  12-14
% not  in school  47%  35%
All grades (1-9)  8269358  8476265  8567694  8525478  6-14
Out of school  2440106  1616522
% not  in school  22%  16%
Source:  Ministry  of Education
Appendix  Table A2
Percentage of Child Workers in Establishments  with Employees
1994
Industry/Age  Below 13  13-14  15-17  Row total  Column  G
________________________  ~~~~~~~~  ~~~Girls/Boys
1  2  3  4(1+2+3)
Mining, Quarrying  0.00  0.00  0.68  0.68  0.14  18.50
Manufacturing  0.01  0.16  3.35  3.52  61.66  70.80
Electricity, Gas  0.00  0.01  0.17  0.18  0.21  17.00
Construction  0.00  0.06  0.95  1.01  0.89  27.30
Trade, Rest/Hotels  0.03  0.40  3.61  4.05  27.95  62.80
Transport/Communication  0.00  0.01  0.41  0.42  0.95  50.40
Finance  and relate  0.00  0.01  0.18  0.19  0.50  45.80
Commuminty/SociallP  0.07  0.38  3.00  3.44  7.69  26.30
Total  0.02  0.20  2.76  2.98  100.00  63.90
Source:  Banpasiric  (1995)
27Appendix  Table A-3a
Labour  Force Participation  and Wages
Boys 13-16  Girls 13-16
Coeff  S. Err  Coeff  S. Err
log wage  0.522  0.176  0.101  0.162
number of persons  0.035  0.009  0.038  0.009
number of siblings  0.041  0.014  0.026  0.013
no of older sibs  0.025  0.030  0.067  0.027
edh2  -0.061  0.082  0.064  0.074
edh3  -0.237  0.058  -0.115  0.052
edh4  -0.638  0.078  -0.557  0.073
edh5  -1.190  0.080  -0.849  0.080
edh6  -1.436  0.171  -0.485  0.113
edh8  -1.407  0.153  -0.598  0.105
edh9  -1.833  0.220  -0.116  0.107
edh&O  -1.922  0.333  -0.285  0.157
edhll  -1.723  0.155  -1.073  0.126
edhl2  0.416  0.512  -0.539  0.205
edhl3  -0.814  0.237  -0.025  0.120
rg2yr85  0.295  0.111  0.087  0.090
rg3yr85  -0.812  0.166  0.278  0.064
rg4yr85  -0.191  0.129  0.227  0.101
rg5yr85  -0.966  0.199  0.129  0.082
rglyr88  0.007  0.111  0.031  0.113
rg2yr88  0.668  0.087  -0.147  0.102
rg3yr88  -0.644  0.158  0.150  0.081
rg4yr88  -0.088  0.099  0.089  0.104
rg5yr88  -0.900  0.137  0.024  0.103
rglyr9l  -0.171  0.120  -0.354  0.089
rg2yr9l  0.404  0.111  0.054  0.082
rg3yr9l  -0.720  1  0.187  -0.155  0.100
rg4yr9l  -0.361  1  0.172  -0.070  0.116
rg5yr91  -0.780  1  0.205  0.132  0.098
rglyr92  -0.400  [  0.13  1  0.706  0.235
rg2yr92  0.284  0.119  1.312  0.245
rg3yr92  -0.740  L  0.146  1.651  0.245
rg4yr92  -0.451  0.156  1.789  0.258
rg5yr92  -0.933  0.203  -0.068  0.007
age 13  0.274  0.226  0.057  0.007
age 14  0.705  0.226  -0.228  0.087
age 15  0.965  0.232  -0.458  0.102
age 16  1.173  0.235  -0.372  0.090
agehead  -0.063  0.009  -0.578  0.127
agehead  20.051  0.008  0.087  0.073
mdlreg2  -0.390  0.048  0.140  0.097
rndlreg3  0.245  0.085  -0.448  0.131
rndlreg4  -0.095  0.062  -0.366  0.108
rndlreg5  -0.134  0.107  -0.710  0.152
rnd3reg  10.232  0.074
Number  of obs  15165  15603
Log Likelihood  -7463.5484  -8409.13
28Appendix  Table A-3b
School Participation  and Wages
Boys  13-16  Girls 13-16
Coeff  S.Err  Coeff  S.Err
log wage  -0.824  0.156  -0.759  0.154
number  of persons  -0.026  0.009  -0.038  0.009
numnber  of siblings  -0.082  0.013  -0.057  0.013
no of older  sibs  0.027  0.028  0.024  0.026
edh2  0.099  0.077  0.077  0.072
edh3  0.270  0.055  0.332  0.051
edh4  0.685  0.073  0.727  0.069
edh5  1.234  0.072  0.904  0.074
edh6  1.500  0.145  0.518  0.106
edh8  1.367  0.124  0.718  0.100
edh9  1.602  0.150  0.264  0.103
edhlO  1.547  0.203  0.220  O.ISI
edhll  1.680  0.123  1.241  0.118
edhl2  0.311  0.517  0.613  0.180
edhl3  0.969  0.213  0.260  0.113
rg2yr85  -0.224  0.106  -0.135  0.090
rg3yr85  0.755  0.150  -0.211  0.064
rg4yr85  0.468  0.121  -0.239  0.095
rg5yr85  1.289  0.176  0.023  0.077
rglyr88  0.182  0.105  -0.291  0.107
rg2yr88  -0.565  0.084  0.367  0.101
rg3yr88  0.763  0.143  0.239  0.079
rg4yr88  0.295  0.094  -0.040  0.097
rrgSyr88  1.038  0.122  0.223  0.097
rglyr9l  0.290  0.112  0.424  0.088
rg2yr9l  -0.282  0.107  0.372  0.080
rg3yr91  0.873  0.170  0.195  0.092
rg4yr9l  0.711  0.157  0.535  0.110
rg5yr91  1.128  0.182  -0.037  0.093
rglyr92  0.589  0.121  -1.324  0.231
rg2yr92  -0.136  0.110  -1.800  0.240
rg3yr92  0.809  0.131  -2.128  0.240
rg4yr92  0.817  0.142  -2.176  0.252
rg5yr92  1.308  0.181  0.093  0.007
age 13  -0.579  0.218  -0.080  0.007
age 14  -0.937  0.219  -0.268  0.087
age 15  -1.111  0.224  0.416  0.098
age 16  -1.315  0.227  0.400  0.088
agehead  0.067  0.008  1.012  0.123
agehead2  -0.054  0.008  0.149  0.071
rndlreg2  0.239  0.048  -0.405  0.097
rndlreg3  -0.146  0.077  0.464  0.125
rndlreg4  -0.021  0.058  0.434  0.105
mdlreg5  0.032  0.092  1.142  0.146
md3regl  -0.146  0.071
Number  of obs  =  15165  15603
Log Likelihood  =  -8248.7116  -9047.17
29Appendix  Table A-4
Annual Expenditure per Student (Baht)
and Public/Private  Enrollment by Education Level
Average  Public  Private  PrivlTotal
Enrollment
Child  development  Center  838  525  1336  38.6%
Kindergarten  1283  579  2192  43.6%
Elementary  787  564  2067  14.8%
Lower  secondary  1425  1287  2376  12.7%
Upper secondary  1948  1786  3546  9.2%
Upper sec -vocational  3274  2505  4082-  48.8%
University  4228  3584  5845  28.5%
Others  2536  1287  6082  26.0%
Unknown  2097  2585  1804  62.5%
fFA:veragef  ::0:  :;;  0X ::0-;  :0:  ,:X  t;1354  1016  2730  .19.7%
Source:  NSO  Report  on Children  and Youth  Survey  1992,  p  29
Appendix Table A-5
Sources of Educational Finance
(% of students  3-24 years old in each category)
HH members  97.7
Relatives,  non HH  1.2
Self-work  0.4
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